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Corporate Codes in the Varieties of
Capitalism: How Their Enforcement Depends
on the Differences Among Production
Regimes
GUNTHER TEUBNER*
ABSTRACT

Globalization has reinforced the conflicts among the varieties of
capitalism. The colliding units are not just nation states, but
transnational production regimes, which cut through national
boundaries. The conflicts lead global corporate codes, which are
developed by international organizations, to take different directions
when they are concretized on the enterprise level. They will be differently
enforced according to whether they are located in Liberal Market
Economies (LME), adapted to the New Sovereignty of enterprises, or in
CoordinatedMarket Economies (CME) with greater components of social
welfare state and economic democracy.
Different patterns of enforcement emerge particularly when the
courts have to decide whether corporate codes are legally binding.
Multinational corporationsseek by any means to keep the courts out. For
them, interpretation, application, and enforcement of the codes are
exclusively a matter of private ordering. Thus, they insist that their
"voluntary" codes are legally non-binding. Accordingly, American courts
are very reluctant when public interest litigation pushes them to
implement the codes as legally binding rules.
The chances of enforcement appear to be different in continental
Europe. If they are adapted into thoroughly regulated neo-corporate
arrangements, then the codes will be confronted with stronger legislative
activities and stronger enforcements by the courts. In the European
Union, the codes of conduct will have to adapt to the principles of the
welfare state and economic democracy.
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I. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM - VARIETIES OF LAW

It is not by chance that a recent comparative analysis of corporate
codes of conduct, which analyzes their chances of private law
enforcement, chooses British and German law as its objects.' It is not
only the difference between common law and civil law that makes this
choice informative; rather, it is the difference between the economic
cultures of the two countries that suggests comparing how they enforce
corporate codes via their national private law. Anna Beckers speaks of
"two opposing poles within the Varieties of Capitalism" 2 and argues that
their extreme differences provide the test cases for whether common
global responses for the corporate codes phenomenon are possible. In
her analysis, two questions are in the foreground. Is it possible (1) to
realize uniform responses to a global problem in spite of fundamentally
diverging approaches to the regulation of corporations and market, and
(2) to identify equivalent solutions for such differently organized forms
of market activity and the related legal frameworks? In a fine-grained
comparative analysis, she discovers commonalities in spite of
differences. And when she discovers divergences, she can show that
divergent national doctrines often serve as functional equivalents for
solving similar problems in advanced economies.
The considerations that follow will complement these two
arguments. They will analyze how socioeconomic contexts, more
precisely, the varieties of capitalism in the transatlantic area, influence
the formulation and the enforcement of corporate codes. The codes take
on a different character, depending upon the production regime they are
implemented in. This is due not primarily to their adaptation to local
particularities of the individual enterprise, but to their institutional
embedding in one of the divergent production regimes.
How do the varieties of capitalism impact law in general? 3 The
recent trends to globalization lead, paradoxical though it sounds, not
necessarily to a convergence of social orders and a unification of law.
Rather, globalization itself produces new sharp differences. 4 This leads
1. See generally ANNA BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
CODES: ON GLOBAL SELF-REGULATION AND NATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2015) (offering an
international comparison of corporate social responsibility codes).
2. Id. at 44.
3. For a discussion on their impact on economic constitutions, see Gunther Teubner,
TransnationalEconomic Constitutionalism in the Varieties of Capitalism, 1 ITALIAN LAW
JOURNAL 219 (2015). For a discussion on global corporate constitutionalism, see JEANPHILIPPE ROBt, et al., MULTINATIONALS AND THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD

POWER SYSTEM (2016).
4. In the early discussion on globalization, it already became clear that Samuel P.
Huntington, with his apocalyptic predictions, had exaggerated global divisions. See
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not to greater legal unification but to a stronger fragmentation of legal
orders as a direct consequence of globalization. This is true for state law
as well as for private ordering.
Comparative political economy confronts us with surprising
empirical results, which fundamentally place the convergence thesis
into question.5 The results are confirmed by economic history studies on
the autonomy of economic cultures, which from a perspective of longue
dure show the resiliency of collective mentalities and particularities of
production cultures.6 Empirical inquiries and theoretical explanations of
the "varieties of capitalism" school support the proposition that, against
all expectations, the globalization of markets and the computerization of
the economy have not led to a convergence of economic institutions and
economic law.
Despite all assertions of minimization of transaction costs, market
selection, re-litigation, and regulatory competition, which indeed ought
as evolutionary selectors to have effectively smoothed out institutional
differences, the economic conditions of advanced capitalism have not
converged. 7 Just the opposite, the process of globalization, and even the
unification measures in the European common market, have produced
new institutional divergences. Despite the liberalization of the global
markets and the erection of the common market in Europe, one of the

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFF. Summer 1993, at 22,
22. See also Mike Featherstone & Scott Lash, Globalization, Modernity and the
Spatializationof Social Theory: An Introduction, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 1, 1-3 (Mike
Featherstone et al. eds., 1995) (providing a more realistic view that sees a simultaneous
increase in convergence and divergence as a consequence of globalization).
5. The leading reference book is VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).

For subsequent analyses, see Peter A. Hall & Kathleen Thelen, Institutional Change in
Varieties of Capitalism, 7 Soclo-EcON. REV. 7, 7-9 (2009). See also Anke Hassel,
Adjustments in the Eurozone: Varieties of Capitalism and the Crisis in Southern Europe,
76 LONDON SCH.

ECON. EUR.

IN QUESTION

DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 7-9 (2014)

(discussing the causes of and reaction to the Eurozone crisis).
6. See generally WERNER ABELSHAUSER, THE DYNAMICS OF GERMAN INDUSTRY:
GERMANY'S PATH TOWARD THE NEW ECONOMY AND THE AMERICAN CHALLENGE (2005)

[hereinafter ABELSHAUSER, THE DYNAMICS] (discussing the German model of industrial
organization); Werner Abelshauser et al., Kultur, Wirtschaft, Kulturen der Weltwirtschaft
[Culture, Economy, Cultures of the World Economy], in KULTUREN DER WELTWIRTSCHAFr
[CULTURES OF THE WORLD ECONOMY] 9 (Werner Abelshauser et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter
Abelshauser, Culture] (analyzing the historical development of various economic cultures).
7. See generally Wendy Carlin & David Soskice, Reforms, Macroeconomic Policy and
Economic Performance in Germany, in ECONOMIC POLICY PROPOSALS FOR GERMANY AND

EUROPE 72,

72-118 (Ronald Schettkat & Jochem Langkau eds., 2008)

(mapping

contradictory economic trends in Germany); POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN CAPITALISM:

MAPPING CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY (Colin Crouch & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1997)
(describing the divergence of different types of capitalism).
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most noteworthy results of the last forty years is that in the most varied
economic institutions-in the arrangements of corporate governance, in
the financial regimes of enterprises, in collective labor relations, in the
education of managers, in the contractual relations between enterprises,
in interorganizational networks, in standardization processes, and in
intercorporate industrial relations-institutional divergences have
increased rather than decreased. 8
Production regimes are institutional framework conditions for
economic activity.9 They structure the production of goods and services
by way of markets and market-related institutions. The "rules of the
game" of economic activities, that is, the incentives and constraints of
economic transactions, will be formulated through an ensemble of
institutions in which economic activities are embedded. The marked
idiosyncrasy of each such production regime is explained by theory: the
individual institutions within an economic area no longer exist by
themselves, but with each other form interdependent elements of a
stable system. The single institutions-corporate governance, enterprise
financing, managerial education, contractual relationships between
enterprises, interorganizational networks, standardization processes,
and interenterprise conflict regulation-together form an interlocked
system that tends toward self-regulation.
The variants within capitalism do not bring with them a mere
renationalization of economic constitutions. Of course the production
regimes have their historical sources in the old unity of nation-state and
national economy. However, with the dominance of transnational
enterprises and their subsidiaries, and with the globalization of markets
and their differentiation into various branches, this unity has been
broken.' 0 The production regimes have expanded beyond their
territorial state borders. In principle a single production regime will be
shaped by differing local power centers: the autonomous rule production
in deterritorialized transnational enterprises, the domination of only
one economic culture in individual branches of the global economy, and
the regulations of the individual nation states. This results in a complex
8. See generally, David Soskice, Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and
UncoordinatedMarket Economies in the 1980s and 1990s, in CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN
CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 101, 101-34 (Herbert Kitschelt et al. eds., 1999) (analyzing
the different dimensions of production regimes).
9. See generally Carlin & Soskice, supra note 7 (explaining the different production
regimes as stable national or regional configurations of economy, politics, and law which
are responsible for the varieties of capitalism).
10. The most dramatic development seems to be the replacement of national
production regimes by sectorial regimes. See Philippe C. Schmitter, Sectors in Modern
Capitalism:Modes of Governance and Variation in Performance, in LABOR RELATIONS AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (Renato Brunetta & Carlo DellAringa eds., 2016).
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situation, typical for transnational relations. Faced with intersecting
boundaries of economic cultures that exist in multinational
corporations, in contractual regulations of supply and distribution
networks, in different industries in world markets, and in national
regulatory regimes, a high functional specification coincides with the
simultaneous overlapping of different systems of norms. The individual
production regimes maintain their identities against the global
economic institutions in their "persistence, transnational hybridization,
and path dependency."" The literature on transnational law established
the expression "inter-legality," which refers to the dissolution of clearly
divided areas of validity of territorial legal orders in favor of their
interpenetration. 12 Larry Backer accurately captures the current global
constitutional (dis)order with these four marking characteristics:
13
"fracture, fluidity, permeability, polycentricity."
However, if one looks at the production regimes of Europe and the
United States, it appears that a countertrend to the varieties of
capitalism has developed, in which the European and American
production regimes are increasingly converging. The liberalization of
world trade, the end of the trade restrictions of the East-West conflict,
and falling transport and information costs unleashed adaptation
pressures upon the European welfare states, which were widely
understood as having no alternative.1 4 In recent years, the traditional
corporate production regimes of continental Europe have been
increasingly dismantled, and they increasingly approached the AngloAmerican production regime.
From codetermination to bank participation in enterprises up to the
triangular cooperation of enterprise associations, labor unions, and
government, the neo-corporatist institutions ran into pressure. Not only
economists critical of neo-corporatism, but even Wolfgang Streeck, the
most important theoretician and sympathizer of European post-war
corporatism, predicted that the democratic elements of the European

11. Abelshauser, Culture, supra note 6, at 19.
12. See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEw LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 436-38 (2d ed. 2002) (describing interlegality as "the
intersection of different legal orders" and "a highly dynamic process because the different
legal spaces are non-synchronic"). See generally Marc Amstutz & Vaios Karavas,
Rechtsmutation Zu Genese Und Evolution Desrechts Im TransnationalenRaum [Legal
Mutation: Genesis and Evolution of Law in the Transnational Sphere], 8
RECHTSGESCHICHTE 14 (2006) (detailing how transnational law is going through a
"mutation" away from the traditional interaction with legal texts).
13. Larry CatA Backer, The Structure of Global Law: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability,
and Polycentricity 102 (Consortium for Peace Ethics, Working Paper No. 2012-7/1, 2012),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2091456.
14. See Abelshauser, Culture, supra note 6, at 10-14.
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production regime would not survive the recent wave of globalization. 15
The necessary fine-tuning between social organizations and political
institutions could not be replicated on a global scale, and the amount of
mutual trust and sociocultural consensus, which here was a
precondition, could not be globalized. Already at the European level,
where institutions of "social dialogue" between the European
Commission, the Confederation of European Trade Unions, and the
European Economic Associations have been experimented with, an
expansion of the neo-corporatist model beyond the nation-state proved
to be of little success. On a global scale, however, neo-corporatist
arrangements would fail completely due to an inherent contradiction.
The self-reproduction of social systems on global paths would become
derailed since only national institutions are available for their politicallegal constitutionalization.
Against these powerful trends of liberalization, it comes as a
surprise that most recently democratic corporatism in continental
Europe has recovered considerably.1 6 The transition from standardized
mass production to post-Fordist diversified quality production in the
eighties; the decentralization of collective bargaining on the enterprise
level in the midnineties; and the cooperation between enterprise
associations, trade unions, and governments during the economic crisis
of 2008-2009 resulted in a transformation of post-war corporatism. This
proves the resilience of post-war corporatism despite globalization and
economic crisis.' 7 The transformation particularly took place in the
power relations within the corporate triangles at the macro, meso, and
micro levels.18 The center of power has notably shifted to the "producer

15. See WOLFGANG STREECK, RE-FORMING CAPITALISM: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE
GERMAN POLITICAL EcONOMY 260-68 (2009); WOLFGANG STREECK, BUYING TIME: THE
DELAYED CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 126-34 (Patrick Camiller trans., 2014).

16. For a discussion of the recent developments of neo-corporatist regimes, see Renato
Brunetta & Carlo Dell'Aringa, LABOR RELATIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).

17. See generally Christian Dustmann et al., From Sick Man of Europe to Economic
Superstar: Germany's Resurgent Economy, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 167 (2014) (providing rich
empirical material for support); Werner Eichhorst & J. Timo Weishaupt, Mit NeoKorporatismusdurch die Krise? Die Rolle des Sozialen Dialogs in Deutschland, Osterreich
und der Schweiz [Through the Crisis with Neo-Corporatism? The Role of Social Dialogue
in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland], 59 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIALREFORM 313 (2013)

(showing through a case study focused on the role of social partners following the Great
Recession in 2008-2009 that policy formulation was either based on well-established
corporatist interest intermediation procedures or on more informal interactions).
18. The model of corporatism has not been done away with in this phase but, rather,
has been transformed and adapted to the conditions of globalization. See Gunnar Flume,
Das Modell Schweden: Kontinuitat und Wandel einer Wirtschaftskultur [The Swedish
Modek Continuity and Change in an Economic Culture], 24 GESCHICHTE UND
GESELLSCHAFT 114, 119-32 (showing that the model of corporatism has not been done
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coalitions" on the enterprise level, while on the macro level they were
supported in the background by the cooperation of the industry
associations, sectorial trade unions, and governmental instances, which
guarantee higher productivity and prevention of crises. For Germany,
empirical investigations show that the decisive impulse for success was
not only the government's Agenda 2010, but above all the intensive
cooperation between enterprises and works-councils, which were
supported by labor-unions, industry associations, and governments
alike. The economic and social success of democratic corporatism in
comparison to the production regimes of England and the United States
has been so impressive that the American Nobel prize winner Stiglitz
recommended the Scandinavian or German way as a model for the
United States.19
Against all previsions of the collapse of neo-corporatism and
economic democracy, varieties of capitalism have established
themselves in the transatlantic space as a result of globalization, in
which the resistance of European economic cultures against the
worldwide successful praxis of standard capitalism is notable. The
economic constitutions of Scandinavian and Rhine capitalism are
characterized by massive welfare-state regulations, the participation of
strong labor unions, and the coordination by tightly woven neocorporatist organizations. It is particularly in their economic democratic
elements that they differ markedly from the liberal finance-capital
dominated economic constitutions of Anglo-American minting, which
rely for their coordination, above all, on markets and hierarchically
organized enterprises. After the economic crises of 2008, the neocorporatist arrangements appeared to be the more attractive production
regime because their historical comparative advantage, higher
20
productivity, and increased social legitimacy.
away with in this phase but, rather, has been transformed and adapted to the conditions
of globalization); Fr6d6ric Varone et al., The Transformation of Neo-Corporatism:
Comparing Denmark and Switzerland Over Time, ECPR Joint Sessions, Working Paper,
2015); Hall & Thelen, supra note 5, at 24-26 (arguing that a more nuanced analysis
within the two broad categories is needed for an understanding of recent transformations).
19. See Deutschland muss mehr tun [Germany Must Do More], SPIEGEL ONLINE (Feb.
4, 2009, 3:29 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/us-oekonom-stiglitz-deutschlandmuss-mehr-tun-a-616745.html (interview of U.S. Nobel Laureate and economist Joseph
Stiglitz) (explaining the benefits of the Scandinavia and German models as a response to
economic recession). See also Labour's Economic Plans: Departmental Determinism, THE
ECONOMIST (Jan. 1, 2014, 5:49 PM), http/Aww.economistum/hlogs/blighty/24/01/Iaboursemnomic-plans.
20. This is the basis for the prediction that there will be yet another revival of neocorporatism and social concentration, likely at the sectorial level. See Philippe Schmitter,
Will the Present Crisis Revive the Corporatist Sysiphus?, in COMPLEX DEMOCRACY:
VARIETIES, CRISES, AND TRANSFORMATIONS 161 (Volker Schneider ed. 2015).
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Altogether, it seems that after a period of relative convergence
toward one "neoliberal" production regime of standard capitalism,
significant differences between the two production regimes have
reappeared-the European production regimes (mainly Germany,
Sweden, Norway, Finland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria) on the
one hand and the Anglo-Saxon regimes of liberal market economies
(Britain, the United States, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand)
on the other. The Anglo-American economic culture forms a group of
"Liberal Market Economies" (LME) that contrast starkly to the
"Coordinated Market Economies" (CMS) of the European economic
culture.
European markets, where neo-corporatist negotiation
arrangements between economic associations, trade unions, and the
government coordinate the economy, have stronger economic,
democratic, and social-welfare-state orientations than their AngloAmerican counter parts. In the latter, industry associations and labor
unions are rather weak and play only a very limited coordination role in
the institutional framework. 21 Instead, we find a relatively
uncoordinated co-existence of free market processes on the one hand
and external regulation by the government on the other. There, the
government, regulatory authorities, and the courts play the most
important role in the formation of regulations, whereby the rules
typically include little margin of appreciation.
Since the financial crisis, the differences between the two
production systems have been reinforced in the following four
dimensions: 22
1. In the Anglo-American economic culture, financial systems put a
relatively short-term horizon on enterprises, which carry high risks. In
contrast, the neo-corporatist culture favors financial modes of
enterprises that work toward a long-term financing.
2. In the Anglo-American economies, the extreme deregulation of
the labor market has driven out collective labor law, which denies
worker interests an effective representation in enterprises. There exist
only weak trade unions, which can hardly oppose the hierarchical
leadership of top management. In contrast, in the neo-corporatist
21. See Carlin & Soskice, supra note 7, at 83-85 (explaining the differences between
the two production regimes).
22. See generally Richard Deeg, The Rise of Internal Capitalist Diversity? Changing
Patterns of Finance and Corporate Governance in Europe, 38 EcON. & Soc'Y 552 (2009)
(examining internal diversity within national models of capitalism in Europe, with a
particular concern with firm financing and corporate governance patterns.); Alice
Johnston & Bob Hanck6, Wage Inflation and Labour Unions in EMU, 16 J. EUR. PUB.
POLY 601 (2009) (examining different levels of wage moderation in EMU member states
since the introduction of the Euro); Carlin & Soskice, supra note 7 (providing detailed
analyses of the four dimensions).
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culture, institutions of economic democracy have been developed that
articulate worker interests quite successfully. In the collective labor
relations of enterprises and of industry, strong cooperative relationships
have arisen, in which trade unions and increasingly the shop-floor
works' councils play an important role and are responsible for the
formation of successful production coalitions on the global market.
3. While in the LMEs, the system of interenterprise relations places
highly competitive demands and at the same time sets sharp boundaries
on potential cooperation between enterprises. The relationships between
enterprises tend in CMEs to develop cooperative networks with
relational long-term contracts, and these both exist horizontally within
the market as well as vertically between producers, transporters, and
sales.
4. In LMEs, the coordination between the economic sector, the
political sector, and other sectors of society will be left either to market
forces or exclusively to state regulation. In contrast, CMEs have
in which
arrangements
neo-corporatist negotiation
developed
enterprises cooperate with welfare-state regulatory institutions and
various social organizations. Economic associations and large
enterprises coordinate markets through the development of technical
standards, standard contracts, and procedures of dispute settlement.
Economic associations negotiate technical and social standards with the
government. The courts create social obligations for economic
enterprises. Thus, a negotiated ordrepublic economique is constructed.
II. CORPORATE CODES IN THE COLLISIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL
PRODUCTION REG1MES

How do the collisions between the two production regimes impact
the corporate codes of multinational enterprises? In recent years,
multinational corporations have been involved in a series of scandals,
which shocked global public opinion. Ecological catastrophes, inhumane
working conditions, child labor, "complicity" of multinational enterprises
in cases of corruption, and human rights violations by political regimes
have raised public awareness of the negative consequences of the
transnationalization of economic enterprises. Political initiatives that
aimed to bind regulations under international law have not been
successful. Instead, another species of transnational norms has
substantially affected the global legal landscape-corporate codes of
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conduct. These are "voluntary" codes of behavior for multinational
corporations. 23
Two different basic variations of the codes have been formed. On the
one side, the global economic institutions of the state world-the United
Nations, the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development
(OECD), the International Labor Office (ILO), and the European
Union-have formulated unitary "public" codes of behavior for
enterprises. On the other side, corporations themselves have
"voluntarily" created a number of "private" corporate codes in response
to substantial public criticism, which is diffused by the global media as
well as by the offensive actions of protest movements and
nongovernmental organizations. These corporate codes posit norms that
make effective self-binding declarations to the public and promise their
implementation
In the relation between the private and public codes an inversion
has occurred of the traditional hierarchy of superior state-law and
subordinate private law norms. 24 A particularly evident reversal is
found in the hard-law/soft-law quality of public and private codes. It is
now the state law providing only nonbinding recommendations that
displays the quality of "soft law," while the private ordering of
multinational corporations effectively implements precise and binding
norms and develops a new form of "hard law."
As a consequence of this inversion, the constitutionalization of the
transnational economy essentially occurs in the corporate sector via the
formation and implementation of private ordering. Not the institutions
of the state, but rather corporate collective actors decide whether
corporate codes will be at all produced, and if so, which content they will
have and how they are to be legally enforced. As a result of drastic
power transfers in the global economy from the public to the corporate
sector, transnational enterprises have become the real constitutional

23. See generally Larry CatA Backer, The Concept of Constitutionalization and the
Multi-CorporateEnterprise in the 21st Century (Coal. for Peace & Ethics, Working Paper
No. 6/1, 2014) (describing these transnational codes of conduct); Gunther Teubner, SelfConstitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of Private' and 'Public' Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 19 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 [hereinafter Teubner, SelfConstitutionalizingTNCs?]; id., CONSImrIONAL FRAGMENIS- SOCIETAL CONSITUTIONALISM AND
GIOBAIZATION (Oxford University Press. 2012), 46-49, 92-96 (describing the emergence of
corporate odes of uonduct).
24. See generally Larry CatA Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview, in
BEYOND TERRITORIALITY:
TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL AUTHORITY
IN AN AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 87 (Giinther Handl et al. eds., 2012) (commenting on the relationship

between both types of codes).

CORPORATE CODES IN THE VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM

91

authority because they create corporate codes through their unilateral
25
public declarations of self-obligation.
Now, the collisions between the European and the American
production regimes incisively change the character of corporate codes.
In the vertical dimension, the varieties of capitalism make it impossible
for the global institutions of the world of states-United Nations, ILO,
OECD, European Union-to provide legally binding corporate codes for
each production regime. If the major production regimes diverge as
described above, then the public corporate codes cannot be formulated
according to the principle of "one size fits all." Instead, public corporate
codes can only embody principles of soft law, while hard law emerges
only in private codes at the corporate level. The public codes can no
longer regulate a unitary global ordre public conomique, but can serve
only as collision rules, while the concrete rules are produced in the
enterprises according to the specifics of the situation.
In the horizontal dimension, the private codes take on a different
character depending on the production regime in which they are
implemented. This is due to their institutional embedding in one of the
two production regimes. They will differ according to whether they
operate in LMEs with their compromise between Keynesianism and the
Chicago School and their priority to private ordering, adapted to the
New Sovereignty of enterprises, or in CMEs with greater welfare state
and economic democracy components in the neo-corporatist triangle of
associations, trade unions, and the state.
The difference between the two production regimes shows itself
clearly in the current virulent question of whether the state courts
qualify corporate codes as legally binding and enforce them effectively
26
under the rules of national law. Multinational corporations seek to
hinder by any means the interpretation and application of corporate

25. For details see Teubner, supra note 23.
26. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 47-148, 366-88; DANIEL KLOSEL, COMPLIANCERICHTLINIEN: ZUM FUNKTIONSWANDEL DES ZIVILRECHTS IM GEWAHRLEISTUNGSSTAAT 5057 (2012) (describing in detail how courts 'juridify" corporate codes). See generally on the
enforcement of transnational private regulation Martijn Scheltema, An Assessment of the
Effectiveness of International Private Regulation in the Corporate Social Responsibility
Arena, 21 MAASTRICHT J. EuR. & COMP. L. 383 (2014) and PAUL VERBRUGGEN, ENFORCING
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE REGULATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADVERTISING AND
FOOD SAFETY (2014). On the interplay between capital market mechanisms, state law
implementation, and social norms see Brigitte Haar, Normanerkennung, Normbefolgung
und Economic Behavior: Eine Studie zu Verbindlichkeitsstrukturen im Wirtschaftsrecht
am Beispiel der Corporate Governance [Rule Recognition, Rule Compliance, and Economic
Behavior: A Study of the Liability Structures in Economic Law Based on the Example of
Corporate Governance] (Goethe Universitat, Working Paper No. 1/2013, 2013) 100 ARCHIV
FUOR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 219 (2014).
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codes by state courts. Thus, they insist categorically that their codes are
"voluntary" and therefore legally nonbinding.
American courts are reluctant when public interest litigation pushes
them to enforce the codes as legally binding rules. They are open only to
juridify market-based social norms. They declare other social norms as
legally binding only insofar as the norms implement consumer
preferences where these preferences are otherwise sabotaged by false or
misleading information. 27 However, responding to appeals for judicial
restraint, courts have denied the binding character to the core material
of the corporate codes. That is, social norms, which proscribe corporate
behavior in the name of the public interest, are not legally binding. 28
The chances for enforcing corporate codes via state law appear quite
different in the European production regime. If corporate codes are
imported into the thoroughly regulated neo-corporatist arrangements,
then the codes must be adapted to fundamental principles of the welfare
state and of economic democracy. 29 They will be exposed to the stronger
legislative activities in the European Union and to a more extensive
juridification by the courts. For example, the European Union provides
for sanctions against enterprises that give false data about the
observation of a code of conduct to which the enterprise has obligated
itself in a binding fashion, if said false data refer to that binding code. 30

27. See prominently Kasky v Nike, 45 P 3d 243.
28. See generally Alexander Peukert, Die Rechtsrelevanz der Sittlichkeit der Wirtschaft
- am Beispiel der Corporate Social Responsibility im US-Recht [The Legal Relevance of the
Morality of the Economy-Based on the Example of Corporate Social Responsibility in US
Law], IN CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBIITY -VERBINDuCHE STANDARDS DES WEIBEwERBSRECHTS?

233 (Reto Hilty et al. eds. 2014).
29. Three main differences explain why European private law tends to be more open to
the juridification of corporates codes than does American law: (1) the role of corporations
in society, (2) the organization of industrial relations, (3) the structure of contracting. For
a detailed analysis, see Anna Beckers, Fall #15-Rechtsvergleichende soziologische
Jurisprudenz [Case #15-Comparative Legal Sociological Jurisprudence], in DIE FALLE
DER GESELLSCHAFT: PRAXIS EINER SOZIOLOGISCHEN JURISPRUDENZ [THE SOCIETIES' CASES:
PRACTICE OF A SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE] (forthcoming 2017).
30. See Council Directive 2005/29, Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, art. 6(2)(b),
2005 O.J. (L 149) 22, 28 (EU); accord GESETZ GEGEN DEN UNLAUTEREN WETTBEWERB
[UWG] [ACT AGAINST UNFAIR COMPETITION], § 5, No. 6, translationat https//www.gesetze-iminternetde/uwg_2004/ (Ger.). The particularities under which the specific codes of conduct
fall within the norm are controversial and courts have not finally clarified their scope. See,
e.g., BECKERS, supra note 1, at 202-05. For an application of this provision in the context
of corporate codes of conduct, see in detail Anthony Bochon & Arnaud van Waeyenberge,
The Role of Codes of Conduct in the Assessment of Unfair Commercial Practices , 10 (6)
Journal of Business Law, 451-464 and Anna Beckers, The Regulation of Market
Communication and Market Behaviour: Corporate Social Responsibility and the
Directives on Unfair Commercial Practices and Unfair Contract Terms 2017 Common
Market Law Review, forthcoming.
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In the European production regime, juridification by the courts,
with which the legal qualification of the corporate codes enters into
newfound land, runs in two opposing directions. In a first constellation,
the courts exert strict judicial control of the contents of the codes in so
far as the codes create compliance obligations for employees or
consumers. In the second constellation, the courts move in the opposite
direction: they transform the codes into binding state law insofar as
they contain self-obligations of the enterprises in the public interest.
In the first constellation, enterprises wish to keep private
compliance rules from judicial control since they want to strictly
implement their internal rules. They insist on exclusive control of their
rules on whistle-blowers, social political activities, internal monitoring,
evaluations of performance, and internal supervision. The courts
intervene nevertheless. The case of Walmart, Germany, is the most
famous. Walmart had enacted strict corporate codes, governing even the
private lives of the employees, and had sought to enforce a clause
prohibiting love and flirtation, which is a standard clause in the USA.
The courts, however, refused to permit Walmart to appeal to the
nonbinding nature of the voluntary code, the successful appeal of which
would have allowed them to escape judicial review. The courts let the
questionable clauses fail, in part based on procedural principles, that is
the participation rights of the works council, and in part on substantive
3
standards of fundamental rights. 1
In the second constellation, the case of Lid1, which has become just
as famous, shows how difficult it is for the enterprises to appeal to the
"voluntary" and nonbinding character of their codes whenever they
declare self-obligations with respect to the public good, but then in
practice do not hold to them. 32 Lidl was sued for anticompetitive conduct
after it made false advertisements and declared that it had fulfilled its
code obligations and immediately agreed to settle the case to avoid
precedent. Similar claims (although on the basis of criminal law) were
initiated in France against Samsung3 3 and recently against Auchan in
relation to the building collapse in Bangladesh.
31. See Arbeitsgericht Wuppertal [ArbG Wuppertal] [Labor Court of Wuppertal] June
15, 2005, NZA-RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT [NZA-RR] 476, 2005 (Ger.); Landesarbeitsgericht
Dusseldorf [LAG Dilsseldorf] [Labor Court of Appeals Dilsseldorf] Nov. 14, 2005, NZARECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT [NZA-RR] 81, 2006 (Ger.); KLOSEL, supranote 26, at 59-62.
32. For an extensive analysis of the Lidl case (VerbraucherzentraleHamburg v. Lidl,
statement of complaint fied Apr. 6, 2010, case settled Apr. 14, 2010) see Lidl lawsuit (re
working conditions in Bangladesh), Bus. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR. (Feb. 18, 2014),
https://business-humanrights.org/en/lidl-lawsuit-re-working-conditions-inbangladesh#c18006.
33. See, for the case against Samsung Bochon & van Waeyenberge, supra note 30, at
457, fn. 27.
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In continental Europe, it is not only competition law but also tort
law, with its highly developed organizational duties; contract law, with
its comprehensive contractual and quasi-contractual obligations; and
finally, the horizontal effect of fundamental rights that have the
potential to transform public interest duties of the codes into binding
state law. 34 With these doctrines, the European welfare-state-inspired
private law has a full toolkit for the legal qualification of corporate codes
at its disposal.35 Thereby the courts can assure the legally binding
character of the codes and enable their enforcement under national law.
In the end, courts can always accuse enterprises of venire contra factum
proprium-a legally relevant self-contradiction-when enterprises have
enacted corporate codes as serious declarations of self-commitment but
then seek to qualify the codes before the court as nonbinding
declaratory intentions.
Another current virulent question is whether corporate codes will
infuse an element of politicization into the diverse economic production
regimes. As for aspirations to economic democracy, the U.S. courts prove
themselves to be rather resistant. Democracy is understood as having
no place in market processes, but is primarily consigned to the political
system. Corporate codes are accordingly strictly interpreted for
conformity to the market.36 Thus, they are only enforced by courts
insofar as they implement the changing preferences of market
participants. Primarily, it remains a matter for the private trade
negotiation committees (TNCs) to react ad hoc in their struggles with
civil society groups regarding the changing preferences of consumers
and investors by public interest oriented codes, so far as this
corresponds to their cost-benefit analysis. A further politicization of the
marketplace is not held to be legitimate there.
In contrast, the economic cultures of continental Europe, with their
neo-corporatist institutions, have historically been directed toward an
internal politicization of economic decisions. Alongside wide-ranging
welfare state interventions, institutions of economic democracy, in
particular, are held to be legitimate, for they, through the participation
34. For the liability of Shell for ecological damages in Nigeria, see the pending case,
Dooh and Vereniging Mileudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell and Shell Petroleum
Development Company, Gerechtshof Den Haag, decision 18 December 2015, Court
Identifier ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3586, para 6.9. http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nllinzien
document?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2015:3586; for the liability of KiK for bad working
conditions in Bangladesh, see http://grundundmenschenrechtsblog.de/supply-chain-liability-thelawsuit-by-karachi-claimants-against-retailerkik-in-historic-perspective/.
35. See BECKERS, supra note 1, at 47-106, 366-88 (explaining the current state of play
and suggesting bold ideas for further legal reforms).
36. See generally Peukert, supra note 28 (analyzing U.S. court decisions on corporate
codes).
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of labor in corporate decisions, are supposed to compensate for market
failures.3 7 In its adaptation to democratic corporatism, continental
Europe has redefined the corporate codes: no longer seen as unilateral
enactment by sovereign enterprises, corporate codes are instead
understood as the result of political conflicts between enterprises and
civil society actors. In addition to other institutions of economic.
democracy, corporate codes serve here to pursue goals of public interest
via re-embedding economic action into society. This occurs however not
through external state intervention but rather in the form of a re-entry:
38
the internalization of social demands in the decisions of the enterprise.
As a consequence, the enforcement of corporate codes is not left
exclusively to the national courts. Rather, judicial enforcement is
accompanied and supported by societal actors who play an increasing
role in the formulation and the implementation of corporate codes at the
local level.
If the internal politicization of the European economic culture has
thus markedly influenced the corporate codes, the codes in turn produce
new impulses for economic democracy. 39 Their first impulse comes from
a change in direction of the protest movements, in which, according to
40
some observers, a new political quality in society has been realized.
Civil society protests are raised increasingly not only against
institutions of the state, but selectively, directly, and intentionally
against corporate actors, which are accused of violating their social
responsibilities. Social movements react to drastic power shifts in the
global economic constitution. It is true, transnational enterprises have
taken over the actual economic pouvoir constituent, because it is they
who, through unilateral public self-obligation, enact and implement the
corporate codes. However, first and foremost it is social movements that,
by their protest, initiate these corporate codes, co-determine their
37. See generally Abelshauser, Culture, supra note 6 (analyzing economic cultures of
continental Europe in a historical perspective).
38. See Teubner, Self-ConstitutionalizingTNCs? supra note 23, at 627-28.
39. For an analysis of the consequences that result from such new institutions in
international law, namely the "welfare state and welfare world," see Isabel Feichtner,
Verteilung in V61kerrecht und V61kerrechtswissenschaft [Distributionin InternationalLaw
and InternationalJurisprudence], in VERFASSUNG UND VERTEILUNG [CONSTITUTION AND
DISTRIBUTION] 93 (Sigrid Boysen et al. eds., 2015) (suggesting that in order to improve
distribution justice the international community should determine distribution conflicts
with the help of political economy and pluralistic legal approaches and institutions should
identify themselves with democratic experimentalism).
40. See COLIN CROUCH, THE STRANGE NON-DEATH OF NEOLIBERALISM, 125-43 (2011).
See generally ROBERT O'BRIEN, ET AL., CONTESTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2000) (arguing that increasing

engagement between international institutions and sectors of civil society is producing a
new form of international organization).
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contents, and monitor their implementation. It is mostly the
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors in civil society
who, through their protest actions, have compelled multinational
corporations to conclude agreements regarding corporate codes. Thus,
civil society's actors realize a particular potential of corporate codes for
economic democracy through their activities, which go well beyond the
traditional neo-corporatist arrangements, which had been only
developed between enterprises and labor unions.
The second impulse for economic democracy drastically extends the
substantive issues within the politicization of the economy. Corporate
codes no longer only mediate the distributive interests of capital and
labor within the enterprise. The civil society protests go much further
than these important but limited themes and compel corporations to
establish encompassing public interests with binding force:
environmental protection, antidiscrimination, human rights, product
quality, consumer protection, data protection, freedom of the internet,
and fair trade. 41 While such themes had been earlier almost exclusively
decided and enforced by the political system, a strange paradox of
economic democracy arises as a result of direct confrontation of civil
society groups with corporations: the public interest will be formulated
and enforced through private ordering. 42 Of course the corporate codes

cannot, like political legislation, claim universal validity. However, for
the individual enterprise the codes have binding, obligatory force since
the civil society groups insist that the power of corporate law
arrangements extends to dependent corporations and that contractual
agreements bind large networks of supply and distribution.
The third impulse for economic democracy proceeds from the selfobligation of enterprises to protect fundamental rights. Here, the codes
go much further than the current doctrines of horizontal effect of
fundamental rights in that they break through their state-fixation and
recognize explicitly a direct effect of fundamental rights on private
collective actors. The codes also make up for certain weaknesses of the
state-law duty to protect. If the fundamental rights standards of the
codes result directly from the democratic potential of social conflicts,
then a higher contextual adequacy is to be expected because
organizations and procedures are more precisely calibrated to the
particularities of the fundamental rights conflicts in economic
41. Niklas Luhmann argues that the new social movements no longer fit the form of
socialist protest. They do not only refer to the consequences of industrialization, but no
longer have the sole goal of a better division of wealth. Their propositions have become
much more heterogeneous. Above all, the ecological theme has crept into the foreground.
See NIKLAS LUHMANN, THEORY OF SOCIETY 154-65 (2013).

42. For a thorough analysis see BECKERS, supra note 1, at 307-09.
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relations. 43 Thus, the enforcement of human rights obligations is not
only performed by national courts, but rather results from a
combination of public interest litigation, self-regulation of the
enterprises, and external monitoring by civil society actors.

43. On such an extension of the third party effect of fundamental rights, see Isabell
Hensel & Gunther Teubner, Horizontal Fundamental Rights as Conflict of Laws Rules:
How Transnational Pharmagroups Manipulate Scientific Publications, in CONTESTED
REGIME COLLISIONS: NORM FRAGMENTATION IN WORLD SOCIETY 139 (Kerstin Blome et al.

eds., 2016).

